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Competitive markets may  underincentivize 
private research investments relative to what the 
social planner would prefer. The patent system 
aims to address this potential  underinvestment 
problem by granting innovators a fixed 
time period during which they can charge 
 supra-competitive prices, thus increasing incen-
tives for private research by allowing innovators 
to capture a higher share of the social returns to 
their inventions.
A  well-developed theoretical literature, dating 
back at least to Nordhaus (1969), has analyzed 
optimal patent policy design. In this paper, we 
have three main goals. First, we  re-present the 
core  trade-off of the Nordhaus model in a man-
ner more similar to how it would be presented 
today, with the aim of making the model more 
accessible to current readers. Second, we high-
light an empirical question which emerges from 
the Nordhaus framework as a key input into 
optimal patent policy design: namely, what is 
the Design anD use of Patents 
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the elasticity of R&D investment with respect to 
the patent term? Finally, we review the, surpris-
ingly small, body of empirical evidence that has 
been developed on this question over the nearly 
half-century since the publication of Nordhaus’s 
book.
I. A Model of Optimal Patent Length
The Nordhaus (1969) model of optimal pat-
ent length identifies the following core  trade-off. 
On one hand, increasing patent duration bene-
fits society by eliciting R&D activity that would 
otherwise not have been conducted, which 
yields socially valuable inventions. On the other 
hand, increasing patent duration harms society 
by giving additional monopoly protection to the 
inventions that society would have enjoyed even 
absent the increase in protection, which leads 
to socially harmful  supra-competitive pricing. 
Optimal policy equates these benefits and costs 
at the margin.
We present a simplified and slightly modified 
version of the Nordhaus (1969) model, mostly 
following the notation of Budish, Roin, and 
Williams (2015).1 A representative firm con-
ducts R&D. In the original Nordhaus model 
R&D is a scalar decision variable, and R&D 
benefits the firm and society by lowering the 
firm’s production costs for its single output 
good. In this presentation, to facilitate the dis-
cussion of empirical elasticities, the firm’s R&D 
1 What we refer to as the Nordhaus model is Nordhaus 
(1969, ch. 5, pp.  76–86). Much of the notation used in this 
analysis is defined and explained in Nordhaus (1969, ch. 2). 
Importantly, as in the original Nordhaus (1969) book, this 
model and our empirical discussion abstracts away from 
important topics such as how patents may affect cumulative 
innovation. 
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decision is instead modeled as a decision over 
which potential R&D projects to pursue, and 
R&D benefits the firm and society by bringing 
to market inventions that otherwise would not 
have existed.
Potential inventions are indexed by  i ∈ I , and 
in total have unit mass. Associated with each 
potential invention are: the cost,  c i , of pursuing 
the invention; the probability,  p i , that the R&D 
will successfully yield the invention; the annual 
profitability,  π i , of the invention to a monopo-
list; the annual social value of the invention, 
 v i 
m and  v i 
c , under monopoly and competitive 
pricing, respectively; and the number of years 
of socially useful life of the invention,  T i , that is, 
the amount of time until the invention becomes 
obsolete. For simplicity, we assume that after a 
patent expires there is free entry and firm prof-
its drop to zero. We also assume that the cost 
of pursuing the invention is a  one-time cost 
incurred at time 0, that the R&D takes no time to 
conduct, and that the annual amounts  π i ,  v i m , and 
v i 
c grow at the discount rate, which is the same 
for the firm and society. Together, these assump-
tions let us ignore discounting which simplifies 
the math considerably.2 Note too that in the 
original Nordhaus model the parameters  π i ,  v i m , 
and  v i 
c are implicit in a demand system for the 
firm’s product; explicitly modeling demand is 
unnecessary for our purposes here, but is essen-
tial in models of optimal patent breadth or mod-
els incorporating business stealing effects (e.g., 
Gilbert and Shapiro 1990; Klemperer 1990).
The social planner chooses  t patent , the number 
of years the firm enjoys a monopoly for an inven-
tion whose R&D is successful. Hence, the firm 
will choose to pursue invention  i if and only if 
p i · min ( t patent ,  T i ) ·  π i ≥  c i ; that is, if the number 
of years of expected monopoly (the success prob-
ability times the minimum of the patent life and 
the total life) times  per-year profitability exceed 
the R&D costs. Social welfare from inven-
tion  i , should the firm pursue the invention, is 
p i · [min ( t patent ,  T i ) ·  v i m +  ( T i − min ( t patent ,  T i )) ·  v i c ] −  c i .
What is the optimal patent term  t patent ? Let  1 {⋅} 
denote the indicator function which returns 1 if 
the statement in brackets is true and 0 if not. Let 
2 See Budish, Roin, and Williams (2015) for a model in 
which both excess private discounting and R&D commer-
cialization lags play central roles in the analysis. 
EM L i =  p i · min ( t patent ,  T i ) and  ET L i =  p i ·  T i , 
denote the expected monopoly life and expected 
total life of the invention, respectively. The opti-
mal patent term solves the following program:
(1)  max 
 t patent 
  ∫ 
I
 
  1 {EM L i ·  π i ≥  c i } 
×  [  ET L i ·  v i c  ⏟ value of 
new inventions
 
 −  EM L i · ( v i c −  v i m )  
deadweight loss
 −  c i ] di.
The solution to equation (1) will depend 
on the distribution of invention parameters. 
To develop the intuition for the core  trade-off, 
consider a marginal increase in the patent term 
t patent . This has benefits and costs. The benefits 
are that more inventions—those that satisfy 
 EM L i ·  π i =  c i with equality—will be elicited on 
the margin. Let  ξ denote the quantity of inven-
tions elicited at the margin; this is the key elas-
ticity parameter that we discuss in greater detail 
in Section II.3 Then the benefits from increasing 
the patent term at the margin can be written as
(2) Benefits =    ξ    ⏟ elasticity of R&D  
wrt patent term
 
 ×
 E EM L i ·  π i =  c i   [ET L i ·  v i c − EM L i · ( v i c −  v i m ) −  c i ]  
social value of marginal inventions
.
The cost of increasing the patent term at the 
margin is that inventions that would have been 
elicited anyway—those that satisfy  EM L i ·  π i >  c i strictly—are given additional time on pat-
ent, which causes additional deadweight loss. 
These costs can be written as
(3)  Costs =  ∫ 
I
 
  1 {EM L i ⋅  π i ≥  c i } 1 { T i >  t patent } 
 
intensive margin 
 
 ×   ( v i c −  v i m ) 
 
deadweight loss 
 di. 
3 Note that we refer to the quantity of inventions elicited 
at the extensive margin from a change in the patent term 
as the elasticity, but in practice the empirical evidence we 
will review attempts to estimate the percentage increase in 
research investment caused by a  one-year increase in the 
patent term. 
VOL. 106 NO. 5 185Patents and ReseaRch Investments
Estimating the optimal patent term in practice 
requires estimating the components of equations (2) and (3). Standard methodologies from fields 
such as public finance and industrial organiza-
tion can guide the estimation of most of these 
components, such as the deadweight loss term 
and the social value of inventions. More con-
ceptually difficult is measuring the invention 
elasticity  ξ , which essentially requires drawing 
inferences about inventions that could have been 
developed—in the sense of being scientifically 
feasible—but were never brought to market 
because the current patent term was insufficient 
to incentivize their development. As we discuss 
in Section II, it has thus far proved difficult to 
construct credible counterfactuals which allow 
for the estimation of this key parameter.
Equations (2) and (3) also suggest some 
heuristic comparative statics for how optimal 
patent terms should vary across technologies. 
The benefits of a marginal increase in the pat-
ent term will be higher when R&D activity is 
more sensitive to changes in the patent term (that is, when  ξ is larger), and when marginal 
inventions are of higher social value. To take a 
simple example, if the social value of marginal 
research on disease prevention is higher than the 
social value of marginal research on treating dis-
eases—perhaps because firms capture a smaller 
portion of the social value from that disease 
prevention research—then society would want 
longer patent terms for disease prevention. The 
costs of a marginal increase in the patent term 
will be higher when a higher share of potential 
R&D would be conducted even in the absence 
of patents (i.e., there are many inventions on 
the intensive margin), and when the deadweight 
loss from increasing patent protection is larger. 
As a simple example of the former, if marginal 
software inventions are much more likely to be 
developed in the absence of patents than are 
marginal pharmaceutical inventions, then soci-
ety would want longer patent terms for phar-
maceuticals than for software.4 As a simple 
4 This example is in the spirit of Mansfield (1986), who 
reports the results of a survey which asked firms what share 
of their inventions would not have been developed had pat-
ent protection been unavailable. While that survey  predates 
many  now-controversial types of patents such as software 
and business method patents, his survey estimates would 
suggest that optimal patent terms would be longer for phar-
maceuticals than they would be for, e.g., electrical equip-
ment, because firms  self-report in that survey that a higher 
example of the latter, if marginal research on 
disease prevention leads to inventions with low 
deadweight loss—for example, because there is 
relatively little  monopoly-pricing distortion for 
preventatives—then society would want com-
paratively long patent terms for preventatives.
II. Bridging Theory and Data:  
Taking Stock of the Empirical Evidence
A wide variety of methodologies have been 
used to investigate the invention elasticity ξ linking patents and research investments, 
including, e.g., the influential line of survey 
work by Mansfield (1986) and others. We here 
focus attention on studies which have attempted 
to identify observational sources of variation 
in patent protection, and use this variation to 
empirically estimate the invention elasticity  ξ .
A. Patent Law Changes as Variation
A natural starting point for estimating the 
elasticity of R&D investment with respect to 
the patent term is to look for variation over 
time or across areas in patent laws. To the 
best of our knowledge, the first such contribu-
tion was Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001), 
who investigate how the research investments 
of Japanese firms responded to a set of 1988 
reforms strengthening Japanese patent protec-
tion. Using a variety of datasets including a sur-
vey of  firm-level R&D spending, they uncover 
no evidence that stronger Japanese patent rights 
induced higher levels of research investments 
among Japanese firms.
This conclusion that  country-specific patent 
law changes induce no measurable increase in 
domestic R&D investment also emerged from 
the work of Qian (2007), who analyzed the 
passage of national pharmaceutical laws in 26 
countries from  1978–2002; and from the work 
of Lerner (2009), who analyzed the impact of 
major patent policy shifts in 60 countries over 
150 years.
Such analyses of patent law changes face 
several limitations. As stipulated by the authors 
of these studies, as implemented in practice—
often as part of trade negotiations—patent law 
share of electrical equipment products would have been 
developed even in the absence of patent protection. 
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changes may affect domestic R&D through 
other mechanisms such as changes in foreign 
competition. A more substantive concern is that 
these studies investigate how R&D investments 
by domestic firms respond to domestic changes 
in patent laws. Conceptually, this concern raises 
two separate issues. First, if a “large” economy 
like the United States were to lengthen its patent 
term, we would expect that to affect R&D invest-
ments of  non-US firms who sell products to US 
consumers. Second, because technologies are 
developed for a global market,  country-specific 
patent law changes in “small” economies may 
be a relatively small source of variation in global 
R&D incentives. That is, a priori, one might 
expect to find that the change in private research 
investments induced by a smaller economy 
extending its patent term from, say, 17 years to 
20 years might be quite small. This is one poten-
tial reason why the available empirical estimates 
of how domestic R&D investments respond to 
 country-specific changes in patent strength may 
all center around zero.
One exception to this conclusion is provided 
by Abrams (2009), who estimates how patent 
filings (as a measure of R&D) responded to 
patent term adjustment under the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS). Abrams estimates that a 114 
day increase in patent term generates a 21 per-
cent increase in patent filings, implying that a 
one year increase in patent term would generate 
a 66 percent increase in patent filings. However, 
Abrams acknowledges that this extremely large 
response could be driven largely or completely 
by substitution in when patent applications 
were filed over time, as his data suggest a large 
amount of strategic “bunching” of application 
filings around the date of the policy change.5
B. Alternative Sources of Variation
Given the potential limitations associated 
with using patent law changes as variation, a 
5 In addition, because Abrams uses patent filings (as 
opposed to a measure of “real” R&D) as his outcome vari-
able, we would expect his estimate to exaggerate the true 
semi-elasticity of interest: lengthening the patent term 
makes it more attractive to file patents on existing R&D 
investments—because the benefits of filing increase—so 
more patent filings could be observed even in the absence of 
any change in “real” R&D investment. 
question naturally arises of whether other types 
of variation could be used to estimate the elastic-
ity of R&D investment with respect to a change 
in the patent term.
In Budish, Roin, and Williams (2015), we 
investigate the following question: are pri-
vate research investments distorted away from 
 long-term research projects, i.e., projects that 
take a long time to complete? We assess this 
question in the context of cancer clinical tri-
als, where—because those trials are generally 
required to show evidence that a drug improves 
patient survival—clinical trials for cancers with 
short life expectancies can be completed much 
faster than clinical trials for cancers with lon-
ger life expectancies. We document a variety of 
evidence suggesting that allowing firms to con-
duct shorter clinical trials would indeed increase 
research investments. One potential mechanism 
for these results is the incentive provided by the 
patent system: because pharmaceutical firms 
almost always file for patents prior to starting 
clinical trials, and because the patent term runs 
from the filing date, effective patent protection 
is longer for drugs that reach the market faster (by nature of requiring shorter clinical trials). 
Importantly, there are other plausible mecha-
nisms through which shortening clinical trials 
could also increase research investments, and 
in Budish, Roin, and Williams (2015) we do 
not disentangle the impact (if any) of patents. 
However, if we make the very strong assump-
tion that the only mechanism through which 
shortening clinical trials would affect research 
investments is through lengthening the effec-
tive patent term, then a  back-of-the-envelope 
calculation based on our estimates suggests an 
elasticity of research investment with respect 
to a one year increase in the patent term of 
 7–24 percent.6
A strength of this approach is that, unlike 
the patent law change approach, we focus on 
a quantitatively large source of variation in the 
effective patent protection provided to inven-
tors who develop different types of technolo-
gies, and we measure the research investments 
of essentially all firms participating in the rel-
evant markets. However, the key limitation 
with this approach is that, as highlighted above, 
translating our estimates into estimates of how 
6 See the online Appendix for details. 
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 patents affect research investments requires a 
very strong assumption (namely, that shortening 
clinical trials would affect research investments 
only through lengthening the effective patent 
term). Hence, we describe this example simply 
as an illustration of how alternative ( non-patent 
law) sources of variation could be used to inves-
tigate how R&D responds to changes in the pat-
ent term.
III. Conclusions
A key parameter needed to inform optimal 
patent policy design is the elasticity of research 
investments with respect to the patent term. 
Estimating this elasticity is conceptually dif-
ficult because it requires constructing a coun-
terfactual in which we can infer that some 
scientifically feasible inventions would have 
been brought to market under an alternative pat-
ent policy design. Despite a near  half-century 
of research effort, we have essentially no cred-
ible empirical evidence on this elasticity. Our 
goal in this paper has been to make the theo-
retical and empirical literature on this question 
more accessible in hopes of encouraging the 
development of novel research approaches to 
this topic. Given that both theory and casual 
evidence suggest that this elasticity is likely 
to vary across different types of technologies, 
understanding heterogeneity in the relation-
ship between patents and research investments 
across industries is particularly important 
looking ahead.
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